China’s Mega-Dam in Tibet Hits India

The construction of the world’s largest hydroelectric dam along the Yarlung Tsangpo River (known as Yarlung Zangbo) in Tibet is part of the People’s Republic of China’s efforts to enhance its domestic renewable energy capacity. At the same time, it could increase tensions with neighboring India, where the river is known as the Brahmaputra, before flowing into Bangladesh and emptying into the Bay of Bengal.

At the center of both issues is Tibet. For Beijing, the region—rich in water resources—serves both as an “armored shield” (a term coined by President Xi Jinping) protecting the geopolitical core of China, and as a springboard toward the West.

China’s Energy Goals

The dam’s construction officially began on July 19 in the city of Nyingchi, in the presence of Li Qiang, the Chinese Premier and a close ally of Xi. The $160+ billion project was approved last December, but feasibility studies began back in the 1980s. The dam is scheduled for completion after 2030. The five cascading hydroelectric stations on the Yarlung Zangbo will produce 300 billion kilowatt-hours annually—equivalent to the UK’s total energy consumption in 2024, and three times the output of the Three Gorges Dam in Hubei province along the Yangtze River.

Beijing aims to maximize Tibet’s renewable potential as part of its broader effort to cut down on pollution. China is the world’s leading producer of hydroelectric power (with 421 gigawatts of installed capacity), dominates the solar panel sector, and is the largest manufacturer of electric vehicles. However, about 60% of China’s energy needs are still met by coal.

For China, improving environmental conditions means raising quality of life, preserving domestic stability, and safeguarding Communist Party control. Additionally, China seeks to export its renewable expertise and expand its infrastructure network through the Belt and Road Initiative, Xi’s flagship project to enhance China’s global geopolitical footprint.

The dam on the Yarlung Zangbo may also serve as a powerful bargaining chip against rival India. Known as the “Roof of the World” or the “Third Pole,” the Tibetan Plateau ranges between 3,000 and 4,000 meters in elevation. Most of it lies within China, while the rest spreads into India, Bhutan, Pakistan, and Nepal. For Chinese strategists, the Himalayas, which border the region, are like a wall shielding China’s vital centers.

From Tibet’s glaciers flow Asia’s major river systems: the Yangtze, the Yellow River (home to China’s main geopolitical hubs), the Irrawaddy, the Indus, the Salween, the Sutlej, and the Brahmaputra. By controlling the plateau, Beijing holds a powerful card in negotiations—and disputes—with countries downstream.

China’s upstream dam-building can limit water flow, undermining the energy, agricultural, water, and defense interests of downstream nations. Moreover, long-term glacial melt in Tibet could harm ecosystems, affecting South Asia and Indochina. China has long debated such issues regarding the Mekong River, in relation to Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia (the last two currently involved in a dangerous border dispute).

India fears that China could divert the Yarlung Zangbo inland toward central China—similar to the South-North Water Transfer Project, which redirects 45 billion cubic meters of water from the Yangtze to northern China. Delhi also fears that, once built, the dam could be suddenly opened by Beijing, flooding downstream areas like a “water bomb,” in the words of Arunachal Pradesh’s Chief Minister, Pema Khandu.

To understand the full gravity of the issue, the water dispute must be considered alongside two other factors that shape Sino-Indian relations.

1. Territorial Disputes

For years, tensions have flared intermittently between Beijing and Delhi along the Himalayas, particularly along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), a provisional border established in 1962 after a 30-day conflict. Incursions and skirmishes are frequent here. Some have even resulted in casualties, badly damaging bilateral relations.

India believes China is trying to encircle it, combining: militarization of Tibet, partnership with Pakistan (India’s arch-rival), cultivation of ties with nearby countries (Bhutan, Nepal, Myanmar) and growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

Beijing, on the other hand, disapproves of India’s alignment with the United States, Japan, and Australia within the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)—an informal alliance aimed at containing China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific.

2. Religion and the Dalai Lama

Over the centuries, Tibet was alternately independent or subordinate to Chinese empires. In 1912, with the founding of the Republic of China, the 13th Dalai Lama declared Tibet independent, with Lhasa as its capital. In 1950, Mao Zedong took control of the region, incorporating it into the newly formed People’s Republic of China. Nine years later, the 14th Dalai Lama (Tenzin Gyatso) fled to Dharamsala, India, deepening the freeze between Beijing and Delhi.

Since the 1980s, the Chinese government has promoted economic development in Tibet and accelerated sinicization of the Tibetan minority to secure their loyalty. However, protests and self-immolations by monks in the early 2000s revealed persistent unrest. Despite economic improvements, Tibet remains one of China’s poorest regions in terms of GDP, making it a potential flashpoint.

In early July, the Dalai Lama stated that his successor would be born in a “free country”—implying not in China. Beijing rejected this, claiming the selection must comply with both tradition and the laws of the People’s Republic. In other words, the next “Great Teacher” (the meaning of “Dalai Lama”) must follow the Communist Party’s directives.

In the medium term, the convergence of water, territorial, and religious issues will continue to fuel friction between Beijing and Delhi, increasing the risk of further clashes on the Roof of the World.