The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is far more than an infrastructure project. Signed at the G20 summit on the 9th of September 2023, the initiative embodies a comprehensive geopolitical recalibration, one with the potential to reshape trade and power dynamics across three continents. At its core, IMEC is a direct counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Its purpose extends well beyond trade facilitation: it is a geopolitical tool intended to reduce global dependence on Chinese corridors, reshape energy infrastructure, and build new strategic equilibria. In contrast to the unilateral structure of the BRI, IMEC is characterised by collaborative investments from multiple partners, blending economic pragmatism with the strategic ambitions of states eager to assert their influence in the emerging world order.
The key to the Middle East
The Gulf states sit at the centre of this recalibration, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates assuming pivotal roles as connectors between East and West. For Riyadh, the project merges precisely with Vision 2030, providing diversification opportunities beyond oil while reinforcing its ambition to become a regional logistics hub. Yet Saudi participation remains cautious: the Kingdom must balance its enthusiasm for IMEC with its reliance on China as its principal oil buyer, meaning its contributions are likely to proceed gradually and in step with domestic megaprojects such as NEOM.
The UAE, by contrast, has taken a more assertive role, presenting itself as IMEC’s “front door”. With the Jebel Ali port operating at its highest capacity since 2015 and Abu Dhabi advancing green hydrogen partnerships with European countries, the Emirates seek to cement their position as indispensable players in both traditional and renewable energy supply chains.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia’s mineral wealth has emerged as a cornerstone of both the Kingdom’s economic transformation and the long-term viability of the IMEC. Over the past decade, Riyadh has dramatically revised its mineral resource estimates, from $1.3 trillion in 2016 to $2.5 trillion by 2025, on the back of significant discoveries of rare earth elements and other critical minerals vital to the global energy transition. The country’s portfolio continues to diversify with lithium and other battery metals essential for electric vehicles and renewable energy storage; rare earth elements indispensable for high-performance magnets and advanced electronics; copper and zinc needed for electrical infrastructure; and gold and silver, for strategic and financial value. This resource bolsters IMEC’s competitiveness by offering Europe an alternative supply chain at a moment when diversification away from Chinese minerals has become a strategic imperative. To reinforce this role, Saudi Arabia has deepened partnerships with French, German, and other European firms for both extraction and processing, creating vertically integrated value chains designed to flow seamlessly through IMEC’s transport and logistics infrastructure. Investment has matched ambition: the Kingdom has committed $100 billion to mining development by 2035, with $20 billion already in advanced engineering stages, while the number of mining licenses issued surged by 144% in the first half of 2025 alone. By pairing this aggressive expansion of extraction capabilities with massive infrastructure investments, Riyadh is positioning its mining sector not only as a driver of domestic diversification under Vision 2030, but also as a critical pillar of IMEC’s strategic and economic logic.
UAE’s logistics
The United Arab Emirates is offering the kind of port infrastructure and logistical sophistication that makes the project immediately viable. Jebel Ali, the UAE’s principal container hub, handled about 15.5 million TEUs in 2024 (with installed capacity near 19.4M TEUs); Khalifa Port has expanded capacity in recent years, reinforcing the UAE’s regional transshipment role; while Fujairah Port provides a crucial strategic advantage by operating outside the Strait of Hormuz, reducing IMEC’s exposure to one of the region’s most vulnerable channels.
The UAE’s wider economic model reinforces this logistical strength: with 70% of GDP already derived from non-oil sectors, the country represents the Gulf’s most advanced example of diversification in line with IMEC’s goals of trade connectivity. The UAE’s interests align strongly with IMEC also due to the UAE-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). This partnership provides an additional boost to trade, with Indian and India-bound cargo flows rising sharply, up from 400,000 TEUs to nearly 577,000 following CEPA’s implementation. Following this example, the country’s energy strategy adds yet another layer of interconnectivity. Abu Dhabi’s Masdar has already formalised green hydrogen supply chains with the Port of Amsterdam, establishing export routes to European markets and leveraging the country’s vast renewable capacity, including the Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park. These projects will support the corridor’s energy infrastructure, including pipelines, electrical grid connections, and hydrogen terminals, and reinforce the UAE’s ambition to transition beyond hydrocarbons and secure a role as a global leader in clean energy.
Palestine – Israel
The corridor faces profound challenges, many of them born of the Middle East’s chronic instability. The 7 October 2023 Hamas attack and Israel’s subsequent military campaign, found culpable of “intent to commit genocide” by the ICJ, in Gaza have cast a long shadow over IMEC, making Israel’s participation as a central collaborator with Gulf states implausible. Making progress towards a feasible and long-lasting peace agreement will push Gulf states to commit to renewing talks regarding the corridor. Furthermore, stabilisation of the war is a necessary condition for the strategic expansion of the Port of Ashdod, alongside the Port of Haifa, for the distribution and processing of goods.
Although there have been no official declarations regarding the role that Syria and Lebanon could have in relation to the IMEC corridor, their geographical position is one of the most critical aspects for logistics. Israel views Lebanon as a disruptor of the IMEC’s timeline and a risk for its trade. Despite this, analysts have argued that Lebanon’s stability is essential if IMEC is to foster wider regional development, while the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has raised questions about how diminished Iranian influence might reshape connectivity routes. Nevertheless, Such proposals envision extending IMEC through Gaza, Beirut, and Tartus as economic engines for rebuilding these economies. The “IMEC Peace Triangle” concept suggests that connectivity between wealthy European, Israeli, and Gulf states with struggling Arab economies could become the economic engine needed to rebuild Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon.
Finally, Egypt occupies a paradoxical position in this matter. The corridor threatens the centrality of the Suez Canal, which generated $9.4 billion in revenue in 2023, but Cairo has nonetheless expressed interest in joining. Egyptian officials point to the country’s existing infrastructure, its strategic location at the crossroads of trade routes, and its role in Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy as reasons for its inclusion, highlighting both the risks and opportunities that IMEC presents to Egypt.
Beyond Gaza
Despite these challenges, the benefits of IMEC are substantial. Economically, the corridor promises to cut transportation costs and transit times by as much as 40%, while creating new opportunities in infrastructure, renewable energy, digital connectivity, and job creation. Geopolitically, it provides a Western-led alternative to Chinese trade dominance, strengthens India’s integration with Middle Eastern and European markets, and enhances energy security by diversifying supply routes. Strategically, it elevates Gulf states as central nodes in global commerce, reinforces US influence in Asia, deepens Israel–Gulf cooperation, and offers Europe a pathway to reduce dependence on Russian energy. Yet the viability of these gains ultimately depends on resolving the region’s entrenched conflicts and rivalries.
For instance, Turkey has positioned itself as IMEC’s most vocal critic, with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan insisting that “there is no corridor without Turkey.” Ankara sees its omission as an offence that undermines its historic role as a transit hub between Asia and Europe. Also, Iran views the project as an explicit attempt to isolate it from international trade flows. By bypassing allies in Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon, IMEC would sideline Iranian influence and undermine the International North-South Transport Corridor it has promoted with Russia.
In this sense, IMEC stands at the intersection of ambition and uncertainty. If successful, it could reshape trade patterns, rebalance regional alignments, and offer a long-term alternative to both Chinese corridors and Russian energy routes. If it falters, it risks joining a long list of unrealised projects in a region where politics often overwhelms economics. Its ultimate trajectory will determine not only the contours of Middle Eastern power but also the future architecture of global trade itself.
