On the 10th of March, the Financial Times ran the headline: “There is no easy exit to Trump’s war”. Indeed, what began as a conflict between the United States, Israel and Iran has been rapidly evolving into a global energy shock with far-reaching consequences.
As Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz, the energy markets around the world have been on edge, convulsing at Trump’s words and Iran’s threats. Production sites across Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have cut output, hit by damage or logistics constraints that prevent them from moving crude to international markets. The result: an estimated 6.2 to 6.9 million barrels removed from the regional market, per day – roughly 6-7% of global oil output with massive price spikes and swings. Just in Asia, there was a spike of 50% for oil and LNG (liquified natural gas).
As oil prices soar and global competition for energy imports increases, how are different actors reacting to this conflict?
China
China is the world’s largest importer of Gulf oil and Iran’s most important energy customer. In 2025, more than 55 % of China’s energy imports came from the Middle East, with roughly 13 per cent supplied directly by Iran. But the economic ties between the two countries do not stop here. In 2021, China and Iran signed a 25-year cooperation agreement worth approximately $400 billion, covering investments in energy infrastructure, transportation and banking in exchange for long-term oil supplies. On a similar note, Venezuela is also the first trading partner for China in Latin America.
This thread makes clear Washington’s intentions with this conflict in Iran: to weaken the energy networks on which Beijing relies.
And yet, China has not responded – not militarily at least, in support of its partners.
In the short term, this translates into a more stable relationship with the United States before the meeting scheduled for the end of the month between Xi Jinping and Trump, avoiding any explicit confrontational tones. Moreover, in case of the energy crisis, China is sufficiently prepared for at least a few months.
In the long term, this strategy allows China to present itself as a stable superpower in opposition to the erratic United States. If Trump plays with time and rhetoric, causing chaos, instability and unpredictability, Xi Jinping does not play by such rules imposed by the United States; he just waits. The more protracted the war in Iran is – especially if it draws in deeper forms of US involvement – the more potential Beijing will have to portray itself as a peaceful actor.
Russia
For Moscow, losing Khamenei as a partner is a setback, but Russia stands to benefit substantially from the energy disruption that his demise has triggered. This opportunity allows Russia to make opportunistic moves and reposition itself as an alternative supplier of both crude oil and liquefied natural gas, especially to China and India. But there is also another actor who seems to be interested in Russian energy: the United States. President Trump has already announced that he is willing to lift sanctions on Russia, at least temporarily, as long as the Strait of Hormuz remains blocked.
Putin, from his end, has extended his hand to the European Union as well, which, however, is far from accepting.
The European Union
The European Union is not directly affected by the closure of the Strait, with only 3.8% of Europe’s energy imports transiting through Hormuz. However, indirect consequences may hit as hard. Now the question is: have we learnt any lessons from 2022?
The idea of an energy crisis hitting the EU is not imminent, says Lagarde, with the European Commission’s energy spokesperson confirming that emergency oil and LNG stocks are full and that there are no imminent availability issues in the short term. Nevertheless, it is also true that given the instability and uncertainty of the conflict, the situation will get worse before it gets better, especially considering that even if the production sites were to reopen now, it would take them at least 4 weeks to actually return to their full operational capacity.
So what are the best and most immediate solutions for Brussels?
The primary response is to release energy reserves in coordination with the International Energy Agency, as decided at the G7 Energy meeting last Tuesday. The IEA is now proposing its largest ever release of strategic reserves: around 400 million barrels – nearly double the amount released in response to the invasion of Ukraine. If fully released, that would be sufficient to compensate for 124 days of lost supply from the Gulf.
But the long-term picture remains murky. There is no clarity on when the conflict will end, and therefore, no timeline for when production will restart. The last-resort option, to involve Russia, is not on the table, as the EU keeps moving away, enacting a regulation in January that bans Russian LNG imports from January 2027 and pipeline gas by autumn 2027, with an oil ban proposal due in April.
Next moves
In such an unpredictable scenario, the EU’s best path is to hold its course: phase out fossil fuel imports from Russia as planned, and leverage this external critical juncture to accelerate the energy transition.
For Trump, the market turbulence is an additional hit to its already weakened position due to the Supreme Court ruling on tariffs. On top of this, its uncertain rhetoric and continuous engagement abroad are not finding any support from the public or the party, condemning him to a significant loss at the midterms – most dramatically, within its own electorate.
For Iran, surviving is already a form of victory. The restructuring of the regime follows a structured path, which no death will prevent from running its course.
For China, it is a matter of stillness and a grounded choice of not playing the US game. For Russia, it is a matter of exploiting this window of opportunity and redirecting its production toward India and China.
