Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been seeking a renewed place in the sun and recognition as a global power. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) represented the economic instrument through which Moscow aimed to reassert its own sphere of influence across the Eurasian continent and to position itself as a counterweight between China’s Far East and Western countries. Despite the ambition to act as a continental bridge, the process of economic integration has progressed gradually and, since 2015, has struggled to expand further. Moreover, the organisation has increasingly oriented itself eastwards and southwards, especially following the rupture with European Union countries after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
In 2025, the EAEU comprised around 190 million people and a nominal GDP of 2.3 trillion. Its main assets lie in the defence industry, raw materials and energy reserves—particularly oil and natural gas—exported primarily via rail networks, pipelines and oil pipelines.
The EAEU was conceived with the declared intention of linking a producing Asia with an importing Europe. However, the construction of its institutional framework has proceeded in fits and starts. Official historiography describes this process as “multi-vector”, a term that effectively denotes a step-by-step evolution characterised by differing speeds and intensities. The Union developed primarily through bilateral, which were subsequently harmonised through broader arrangements ratified at a later stage. Despite the stated objective of acting as a bridge, the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 significantly undermined this ambition.
The idea of Eurasian economic integration took shape in the immediate post-1991 period, with an initial core formed by Russia and Belarus. The first concrete steps were taken in 1995, when Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia—later joined by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—signed preliminary agreements to establish a Customs Union. In 1996, a more structured process was launched with the aim of creating a single market ensuring the free movement of goods, capital, services and people.
A further institutional leap occurred in 2000 with the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), modelled on the European Economic Community and composed of Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; Uzbekistan joined in 2006. In parallel, during the same period, a similar framework that also included Ukraine was under discussion. This process came to an abrupt halt with the Orange Revolution in 2004, marking the beginning of Ukraine’s reorientation towards the Western bloc.
In 2010, a Customs Union was established between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, abolishing internal customs duties. The CU was gradually extended through bilateral agreements. In 2012, the same three states signed the agreement creating the Eurasian Economic Space, strengthening the free movement of production goods. The process culminated in 2015 with the entry into force of the founding treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), composed of five members: Belarus, Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Since then, the Union has not expanded further, but it has admitted several observer states, including Uzbekistan, Moldova, Iran and Cuba.
At the international level, the EAEU has established relations with a range of multilateral organisations, including the WTO—whose regulatory framework it has adopted—as well as UNECE, IOM, ILO, UNCTAD, the OECD and WIPO. Contacts in the form of memoranda of understanding and events have also been initiated with other organisations, including the SCO, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, BRICS and the African Union. The Union is not, however, recognised by the European Union, a factor that significantly constrains its ambition to establish itself as a Eurasian commercial hub.
With regard to relations with third countries, the EAEU has signed free trade agreements with Vietnam, Iran, Serbia and Singapore; an agreement with Indonesia is at an advanced stage, while discussions with India are ongoing. The sanctions imposed on Russia do not apply to the other member states, making the EAEU’s duty-free regime an effective instrument for circumventing Western restrictions. Kazakhstan, in particular, has recorded a significant increase in trade in dual-use technologies—such as drones, microelectronics, PCs and smartphones—since 2022.
Internally, the EAEU’s main vulnerability lies in the pronounced imbalance between Russia and the other member states. Russia’s economic and demographic weight profoundly shapes internal relations within the Union, affecting both labour flows and overall productive capacity. Labour mobility overwhelmingly favours Russia, which imports both skilled and unskilled workers, while its superior industrial capacity makes it a net exporter vis-à-vis neighbouring countries.
This is compounded by an economic structure heavily skewed towards raw material extraction, with limited capacity for refining and industrial transformation. These functions remain largely in the hands of actors outside the EAEU’s core, particularly China, Turkey and countries in South-East Asia. The only sector displaying a degree of industrial autonomy is defence, which nonetheless depends significantly on external suppliers for advanced technologies.
Technological innovation represents therefore another structural weakness. The lack of a solid research and development base represents a constraint that Russia has sought to address, particularly since the invasion of Ukraine, albeit with limited results. Dependence on third countries remains high, as evidenced by reliance on Turkish or Iranian drones and on advanced technologies supplied by China.
Upgrading the infrastructure network constitutes another critical priority. The EAEU spans a harsh and immense territory, often sparsely populated. The outdated network of roads and railways coupled with the absence of direct access to warm-water ports limits the competitiveness of overland routes.
These structural vulnerabilities are compounded by geopolitical ones. Central Asia represents Russia’s true “soft underbelly”: a region historically crucial for the movement of goods and people across Eurasia, traversed by the ancient Silk Road and now at the heart of China’s terrestrial Belt and Road Initiative. Control over this region provides access to the markets of Iran, Pakistan and India, as well as to Indo-Pacific ports.
This area attracts the interests of external actors, first and foremost China, through massive infrastructure investments, and Turkey, which identifies the Central Asian steppes as the cultural cradle of the Turkic world. In this context, the EAEU became the instrument through which Russia seeks to maintain its regional influence, supporting economic, industrial and infrastructural development among its members. However, the war on the western front has entailed a significant diversion of resources, leaving the region more exposed to further external penetrations.
The war in Ukraine has acted as an accelerator of these fragilities. The rupture with the West, the closure of the European vector and the tightening of the sanctions regime have reduced Moscow’s room for manoeuvre, reinforcing a trajectory of increasing orientation towards Asia.
Here lies the central paradox of Russia’s strategy: the EAEU was conceived in part as a tool to contain and counterbalance China’s advance in Central Asia on one side, and to tightening the economic links with Europe on the other. Yet the rupture with the West pushes Russia into growing dependence precisely on Beijing. Eurasian integration, designed as a lever of strategic autonomy, thus risks turning into an asymmetric subordination to China’s economic space.
The so-called pivot to Asia is therefore not a fully voluntary choice, but largely a constrained trajectory. The risk is that Russia shifts from being a commercial balancing point between Europe and Asia to a mere logistical platform for Asian value chains.
In this context, the role of Central Asian countries becomes decisive. Their economic growth, abundance of energy resources and increasing autonomy in foreign and economic policy provide room for manoeuvre that could still reshape EAEU projections and regional balances. Armenia represents an emblematic case: its gradual rapprochement with the European Union, also in light of Russia’s inability to guarantee its security interests in Nagorno-Karabakh, could lead to an eventual exit from the EAEU.
In conclusion, the Eurasian Economic Union is best understood as an instrument of Russian influence in the post-Soviet space, where economic integration responds more to strategic and security logics than to market dynamics. In the medium term, it is unlikely to relaunch itself as a genuine bridge between Asia and Europe: the western vector remains closed, overland infrastructure is uncompetitive compared to maritime routes, and transit costs remain high.
The future trajectory of the EAEU will largely depend on the choices of its junior partners and on the positioning of other Central Asian countries. It is the evolution of these balances that will determine whether the Union can establish itself as a relatively autonomous platform for exchange or whether it will be progressively absorbed into the power dynamics of the region’s major actors.
