In 1993, the G7 accounted for more than half of the global economic product (measured by purchasing power). Now it produces around a third. This is not just erosion—it is dispersion. The global order no longer orbits a single pole but drifts toward an unbalanced multipolarity. The United States is losing its status as the only major power in the world, and the BRICS nations have caught up with G7 members on GDP, now surpassing them with the addition of Indonesia in 2025 (World Bank Data). Yet, within the circle of the G7, it still seemed that Washington’s economic, military and nuclear advantage had left other leaders with few alternatives other than to comply with the wishes of the US or act indipendently (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK) (Verhelst et al., 2025).
The EU, Canada, Japan and other leaders came into the G7 with words of unity and purpose. Stability in trade, diversification of supply chains, strengthening Ukraine while weakening Russia, and fostering diplomatic efforts in the Middle East to solve the raging conflicts. The EU engaged in renewed sanctions against Russia, followed by Canada’s billion-dollar aid to Ukraine, and the British restrictions on Russian oil. Yet, the G7’s unity cracked where it mattered: no coordinated front on Ukraine, no real leverage on Russia, leaving the summit without a joint statement in support of Kyiv, and a U.S. president in the room.
As for the Middle East, the main outcome was a common ground set for their commitment to peace and stability through diplomatic efforts and negotiations, whereas for trade, the lack of movement has left leaders and domestic businesses on edge, with a little less than three weeks until Trump’s July 8 deadline for striking trade accords. Despite the G7 being widely seen as the best opportunity for President Trump and the other G7 leaders to break through deadlocks, no unanimous agreement was reached. Only the UK managed to lower tariffs on British autos from 25 per cent to 10 per cent by the end of June and carve out exemptions for aerospace products from the US’s 10 per cent baseline tariff (Messerly et al., 2025)
In conclusion, this G7 did not fail, but it most certainly did not lead. It confirmed that to convene is not sufficient when there is no strategic cohesion. The G7 speaks with inherited authority, but increasingly acts like a coalition of unequals, lacking cohesion, commitment and drive. In this scenario, legitimacy must be rebuilt, alliances rethought, and commitments renewed.
