What is the Shangri-La Dialogue
The Shangri-La Dialogue, organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), is to Asia what the Munich Security Conference has long been for the European space: the yearly premium venue for defense and foreign policy.
The summit takes its name from the Shangri-La hotel in Singapore, its venue for more than 20 years. In Chinese culture, “Shangri-La” evokes a mythical paradise—peaceful, harmonious. A good auspice for what should be the goal of a foreign policy summit.
Held from 30 May to 1 June, the 2025 edition of the Dialogue was particularly awaited, as it offered the first opportunity to assess the Trump 2.0 administration’s outlook on the Indo-Pacific stage and the reaction of the key players to the new (?) US agenda.
The Dialogue featured a rotation of high-profile speakers. Yet, we focus here on two high-profile and powerfully worded speeches: those of Emmanuel Macron and Pete Hegseth.
Macron’s Line: Allies, But Not Taking Daily Instructions
As geopolitics aficionados know, President Macron has never shied away from bold statements in the area of international politics—from his famous remarks on NATO being “brain dead” onwards. Over the past year alone, he has warned that the EU’s economic and social model risks becoming “out of the market” without a major overhaul, and famously urged Europe to realize it lives in a world of carnivores—and must become, at the very least, an omnivore.
Against this backdrop, expectations for his Shangri-La address were high. Macron delivered. His message was unambiguous: France— taking the mantle of speaking on behalf of everyone who is not among the great powers —refuses to be reduced to a pawn in a bipolar world. “By succumbing to pressure by the two superpowers for other countries to choose a side,” he warned, “we kill the global order, and we will destroy methodically all the institutions we created after the Second World War.”
France, he reminded the audience, is no casual bystander in the Indo-Pacific. In addition to boasting more than one million citizens and vast overseas territories in the region—including what is arguably the world’s largest exclusive economic zone—France maintains a significant military presence, including a carrier strike group currently deployed. The forces based in the region account for a substantial share of France’s deployable assets.
Macron called for a “coalition of action” between European and Asian nations to uphold a rules-based international order amid intensifying U.S.-China tensions. “We want to co-operate,” he said, “but we don’t want to be instructed on a daily basis what is allowed, what is not allowed, and how our life will change because of the decision of a single government.” A message clearly directed at both Beijing—and perhaps even more so—Washington.
Hegseth’s Indo-Pacific Doctrine
Second—though only in sequence—came Pete Hegseth, the U.S. Secretary of Defense. His appointment was among the most controversial of the Trump 2.0 era: a former Marine officer with no prior experience managing large organizations, chosen to lead the Pentagon and its 3-million-strong workforce.
Yet bureaucratic credentials mattered little at the Shangri-La podium. What Hegseth brought was rhetorical firepower—honed through years of media presence—and a vision articulated with clarity. His speech made headlines around the world for its warning: a Chinese military attack on Taiwan “could be imminent.” He called it “a wake-up call” for the region. “There is no reason to sugarcoat it,” he said. “The threat China poses is real, and it could be imminent. We hope not, but it certainly could be.”
But Hegseth’s message was more than this alarmist headline. He laid out a comprehensive vision for the Indo-Pacific, grounded in three pillars: restoring the warrior ethos, rebuilding the military, and re-establishing deterrence. These pillars, he explained, are the foundation for fulfilling President Trump’s overarching directive to the Department of Defense: “achieve peace through strength”—a Reagan-era mantra, one of the few remaining relics of a different age and a different US Republican party: still, a slogan capable of formally aligning NeoCon and MAGA-conservatives.
“America is proud to be back in the Indo-Pacific—and we’re here to stay,” he declared. Ironically, Europe—often a rhetorical punching bag in Trump-era speeches—was held up as a positive example. “And it’s hard to believe I’m saying this,” Hegseth admitted, “but thanks to President Trump, Asian allies should look to countries in Europe as a newfound example.” He praised NATO members for pledging 5% of GDP on defense and challenged Asian allies to match that urgency. While the model allies he cited were Poland and the Baltic States—not the countries from “Old Europe”—a positive reference to NATO sounded surprising to most.
China’s Looming Absence
For the first time since the height of COVID-19, the People’s Republic of China did not send a defense minister or equivalent to the Dialogue. In a statement issued a day before the forum’s official opening, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced the presence of a delegation from the People’s Liberation Army’s National Defense University. This posture has been interpreted as a sign of Beijing’s disapproval of the forum’s perceived Western tilt.
Still, Chinese representatives present at lower levels did not remain silent. Rear Admiral Hu Gangfeng of China’s National Defense University reacted to Hegseth’s speech with some strong wording, calling out “fabrications reversing black and white,” and calling him “a thief crying ‘catch the thief’.”
The Main Takeaways
In recent months, there has been no shortage of commentary on the return of the concept of spheres of influence, with the idea that the United States might accept the dominance of other powers—namely Russia and China—in geographically or politically close areas. There has also been speculation about Trump’s alleged reluctance to spend the proverbial “blood and treasure” in the event of aggressive moves by Beijing toward Taiwan.
However, Hegseth’s speech seems to put a large roadblock in the way of such assumptions. There appears to be no intention on the part of the United States to acquiesce to a Chinese sphere of influence in what China historically considers its courtyard. References to the first island chain and support for allies resisting Chinese claims in the South China Sea make this clear. Regarding Taiwan, the Secretary maintained strategic ambiguity about the U.S. response in the event of an invasion but warned Beijing of the “devastating consequences for the Indo-Pacific and the world” of any hostile action from the PRC. This, together with the frequent reiteration that “America First” does not mean “America Alone”, vindicates the “China First” wing of the Trump administration’s foreign policy team. This line of thinking, from Elbridge Colby onward, emphasizes the importance of focusing on the PRC challenge, prioritizing the strengthening of the American position in Asia, and preparing for a violent showdown if push comes to shove.
That said, listeners and allies are aware of the risks involved in placing full trust in declarations, especially when coming from an openly pragmatic American administration. It would be excessively naïve to assume that foreign policy—including commitments to historic allies—is non-negotiable for an administration built around the cult of the deal.
Shangri-La: Idyll in Turmoil
Even if we refuse to take Pete Hegseth’s warnings at face value, the Indo-Pacific is far from the idyllic utopia that the name Shangri-La would suggests. The 2025 edition of the Dialogue paints a very different picture of the region. Far from being a paradise untouched by conflict, it is increasingly a geopolitical fault line where the world’s two largest powers are rehearsing for scenarios no one wants to see realized. While everyone else maneuvers to find the most comfortable position, knowing full well that if the ball starts rolling for real, nothing is certain.
